The Rule against Perpetuities in Missouri by Hudson, Manley O.
University of Missouri Bulletin Law Series 
Volume 3 April 1914 Article 2 
1914 
The Rule against Perpetuities in Missouri 
Manley O. Hudson 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/ls 
 Part of the Estates and Trusts Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Manley O. Hudson, The Rule against Perpetuities in Missouri, 3 Bulletin Law Series. (1914) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/ls/vol3/iss1/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of Law 
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Missouri Bulletin Law Series by an 
authorized editor of University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please 
contact bassettcw@missouri.edu. 
THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES IN MISSOURI.
It has been pointed out by Professor Gray1 that in the
leading case of Lockridge v. Mace 2 a peculiar application of
the rule against perpetuities was made by the Missouri court.
Contrary to Professor Gray's "confident hope," the court has
shown no disposition to "come into line" with other states, for in
an important recent case 3 the peculiar application was repeated.
It is the purpose of this study to determine the present position
of the rule against perpetuities in Missouri law, and to anticipate
some of the cases to which the bar may expect it to be applied.
STATEMENT OF THE RULE.
The rule against perpetuities is a principle of law which
forbids the creation of any future interest in property which need
not vest in interest within twenty-one years4 (with a possible
addition of three periods of gestation 5) after the end of some
life in being0 at the time the creation is attempted.7  So stated,
the rule is misnamed-instead of being a rule against perpetuities,
it is in truth a rule against remoteness, requiring only that the
vesting of interests in property shall not be postponed until a
time legally remote. The adoption of the more accurate name
has been advocated 8 and would save much confusion.9
1. Gray, Perpetuities (2d ed.) § 249a.
2. (1891) 109 Mo. 162.
3. Shepperd v. Fisher (1907) 207 Mo. 208.
4. Mr. Lewis prefers to leave a definition of the period of re-
moteness out of a statement of the rule. Lewis, Perpetuities 163.
The period of twenty-one years after lives in being has been only
recently established. Cadell v. Palmer (1833) 1 Cl. & V. 372.
5. See infra, note 39.
6. A corporation's Is not such a life. Fitchie v. Brown (1908)
211 U. S. 321.
7. Gray, Perpetuities (2d ed.) § 201; 1 Jarman on Wills (6th ed.)
296; Stewart v. Coshaw (1911) 238 Mo. 662.
8. By Professor Gray-Perpetuities (2d ed.) § 2; and by Mr.
Charles Sweet-12 Columbia Law Review 119, 209; 29 Law Quarterly
Review 305. It is so called by Jessel, M. R., in London d- S. W. Ry.
Co. v. Gomm (1882) 20 Ch. Div. 562.
9. In this article the rule against perpetuities will, therefore,
be called the rule against remoteness.
(3)
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The rule against perpetuities was unknown to the early
common law. 10 The term "perpetuity," as it was first used,'1
denoted an interest in land which was "inalienable for an indefinite
period." 12 Thus it was said in Chudleigh's Case 13 that the stat-
ute De Donis Conditionalibus 14 "in a manner created per-
petuities." In this sense, every estate tail was a "perpetuity"
until means were devised of docking the entail. Even after it
was held in Taltarum's Case 15 that every estate tail could be
barred by common recovery, attempts were made to create "un-
barrable entails" by providing for forfeiture in case any tenant
endeavored "to put away the land from his next heir," 10 but
such conditions were held void, either because they were re-
pugnant, or because they tended to a perpetuity. 17 ,Very similar
was the device of creating so-called "uses of perpetual free-
hold," i. e., successive life estates in the heirs or unborn issue of
a person ad infinitum. Since contingent remainders were inalien-
able,' 8 this device would have accomplished a real perpetuity had
not such remainders been held destructible though created by
way of use.' 9 The name "perpetuity" was also applied to this
device and as such it was generally condemned. 20 The attempt
10. Challis, Real Property (3d ed.) 205.
11. Probably in Chudleigh's Case (1589) 1 Coke 120a, and Cor-
bet's Case (1599) 1 Coke 83b.
12. 1 Jarman on Wills (6th ed.) 278.
13. (1589) 1 Coke 120a.
14. (1285) 13 Ed. I, c. 1.
15. (1472) 12 Edw. IV, 19.
16. Quoting Lord Bacon, Law Tracts 145, cited In 1 Jarman on
Wills (6th ed.) 282.
17. Gray, Perpetuities (2d ed.) § 141c. See Duke of Marlbor-
ough v. Godolphin (1759) 1 Eden 404; Gray, Restraints on Alienation,
§ 75.
18. 1 Fearne, Contingent Remainders 366; Vick v. Edwards
(1735) 3 P. Wins. 372.
19. Chudleigh's Case (1589) 1 Coke 120a. See Gray, Perpetui-
ties (2d ed.) . 141d. Mr. Sweet contends that there is a connection
between this device of a "perpetual freehold" and the rule applied in
Whitbu v. Mitchell (1890) 44 Ch. Div. 85, discussed later. See his
article on "Limitations of Land to Unborn Generations," 29 Law
Quarterly Review 304. Note that "freehold" had the technical mean-
ing of estate for life in this phrase. 29 Law Quarterly Review 307.
20. Humbertson v. Humbertson (1716) 1 P. Wins. 332. See 1
Jarman on Wills (6th ed.) 281, 282.
THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES IN MISSOURI
to create so-called "perpetuities" of leaseholds was likewise
unsuccessful.21
The word "perpetuity" retained its original 22 meaning of
"an inalienable, indestructible interest" 23 until well toward the
end of the seventeenth century, and it did not come into common
use as a synonym for remoteness until the latter part of the
eighteenth century.24 The modern rule against remoteness had
its origin in the Duke of Norfolk's Case25 in I68I, where it
was "settled that a future interest might be limited to com-
mence on any contingency which must occur within lives in be-
ing."20 But the rule was developed slowly step by step and it
was not clearly stated in its present form until the decision in
Cadell v. Palner27 in 1833. The change in the meaning of the
word "perpetuity" has been so recent that it is sometimes over-
looked.28 It may be doubted whether the rule against what was
21. Lampet's Case (1612) 10 Coke 52a. Mr. Gray says this is
the first case in which "perpetuity" is mentioned in connection with
an executory devise. Gray, Perpetuities (2d ed.), § 152.
22. Mr. Sweet still calls it the "primary" meaning of the term.
1 Jarman on Wills (6th ed.) 278. See also 2 Reeves, Real Property,
§§ 957 to 959.
23. Gray, Perpetuities (1st ed.) § 140.
24. It is probable that in 1776, when Mr. Fearne wrote, the
word retained its original meaning. 1 Fearne, Contingent Remainders
(10th ed.) 502. See 29 Law Quarterly Review 318. "Unless the student
grasps the distinction between 'perpetuity' and 'remoteness,' he will
never understand the allusions to this subject in the older reports and
text-books." Quoting Mr. Sweet, 12 Columbia Law Review 202. "That
unfortunate word [perpetuity] has at least three distinct meanings,
for it may mean (1) an inalienable interest, (2) a limitation in the
nature of an unbarrable estate tail, or (3) an interest which is void
for remoteness under the modern rule against perpetuities." 27 Law
Quarterly Review 170.
25. 3 Ch. Cas. 1.
26. Gray, Perpetuities (2d ed.) § 170.
27. 1 Cl. & F. 372. The most important cases between the Duke
of Norfolk's Case and Cadell v. Palmer are: Lloyd v. Carew (1697)
Show. P. C. 137; Stephens v. Stephens (1736) Cas. temp. Talb. 228;
Jeerv. Audley (1787) 1 Cox 324; and Beard v. Westcott (1810) 5 Taunt.
393. These cases are to be found in Gray's Cases on Property (2d ed.)
Vol. V.
28. McDowell v. Brown (1855) 21 Mo. 57; Stevens v. Annex
Realty Co. (1902) 173 Mo. 511: Bank v. Robinson (1902) 96 Mo. App.
285; Buchanan v. Kennard (1910) 234 Mo. 117. Thus, in Gannon v.
Pauk (1906) 200 Mo. 75. it was said that "the law turns a cold face
to perpetuities and the tying up of landed properties by entailment."
2
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formerly known as a perpetuity has any place in our law,2 9'
though usage seems to sanction a continued use of the word
"perpetuity" in the old sense, with reference to gifts to chari-
ties 30 and unenforcible trusts.8 1
The rule against perpetuities, therefore, forbids simply the
remote vesting of interests in property, and only in so far does
it have to do with alienation. Once an interest has been created,
the rule has nothing to do with alienating it.32
THE APPLICATION OF THE RULE IN MISSOURI.
The first Missouri cases to which the rule might have been
applied, involved gifts of slaves. "There is no reason in the
nature of things why the law should not allow the same future
interests in personalty as are allowed in realty." 33 The pos-
sibility of creating future interests in chattels personal, whether
by way of remainder or by way of executory limitation, is quite
generally recognized in the United States.8 4 In most of the
29. Mr. Sweet insists on distinguishing between the old rule,
against perpetuities and the modern rule. 1 Jarman on Wills (6th ed.)
Ch. X.
30. Bank v. Robinson (1902) 96 Mo. App. 385; Buchanan v. Ken..
nard (1911) 234 Mo. 117: Ames' Cases on Trusts (2d ed.) 201. note.
But see Gray, Perpetuities (2d ed.) H. 894 to 909.
31. Bequests to trustees to use the income in keeping a monu.-
ment in repair or in saying masses, are usually held invalid as in
"violation of the rule against perpetuities," by which the courts.
mean, as Professor Clark has pointed out, "a rule which is a part of
the more general rule against restraints upon, or suspensions of,
alienation." 10 Michigan Law Review 33.
32. Gray, Restraints on Alienation (2d ed.) § 8.
33. Quoting Professor Gray in 14 Harvard Law Review 397,
401.
34. Schouler, Personal Property 92; Gray, Perpetuities (2d ed.)
§§ 88 et seq.; Waldo v. Cummings (1867) 45 Ill. 421; Riggins v. Me-
Clellan (1859) 28 Mo. 23; Lewey's Curators v. Lewey (1864) 34 Mo.
367: McCormick v. Kirby (1876) 63 Mo. 149; State ex rel. Farley v.
Welsh (1913) 162 S. W. 637. The English law is not clear: Williams,
Personal Property (16th ed.) 358; 2 Jarman on Wills (6th ed.) 1183.
After life interests only executory interests may be created in chat-
tels real in England: Mannina's Case (1609) 8 Co. 94b; Cotton v.
Heath (1638) Roll. Ab. 612, pl. e; Wrioht v. Cartwriaht (1757) 1
Burr. 282. In the United States the rule may be different: Culbreth.
v. Sgmith (1888) 68 Md. 450. See Waldo v. Cummings (1867) 45 Ill.
421, 427. On the general subject of Future Interests in Personal,
Property, see Professor Gray's Article, 14 Harvard Law Review 397.
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American jurisdictions, no distinction is drawn between deeds
and wills in the creation of such interests 35 and the only restric-
tion is that remoteness must be avoided. But in Wilson v,
Cockrell, 6 the Missouri court held that an executory interest
in slaves could not be created by deed.37 A gift of certain slaves
was made by deed in consideration of love and affection to
Juliet, her executors, administrators and assigns, and of certain
other slaves to William in like manner, "but should either Juliet or
William die without heirs, then the property of the one so dying
shall absolutely vest in the other." 38 After the death of Juliet
without heirs (of her body), William brought replevin for a
female slave and the court gave judgment for a purchaser fron
Juliet. While the reasoning of the opinion is not clear, no ques-
tion of remoteness was considered though it was suggested by'
counsel.3 9 The limitation over was on an indefinite 40 failure of:
heirs which may be construed as an indefinite failure of issue, 4
35. Gray, Perpetuitles (2d ed.) § 91. The rule is settled other-
wise in North Carolina. Harrell v. Davis (1861) 8 Jones 359.
36. (1843) 8 Mo. 1.
37. This proposition was laid down on the authority of Betty v.
Moore (1833) 1 Dana 235, which can be explained as deciding only
that a gift of a slave to one and the heirs of his body carried the
absolute interest. Wilson v. Cockrell stands alone In the United
States. 14 Harvard Law Review 397, 416.
38. The exact language of the deed Is not given in the report-
the quotation is from the opinion of the court.
39. The rule against perpetuities is thus stated in the counsel's
brief: "A remainder which may not take effect within a life or lives
in being twenty-one years and about ten months thereafter, never
was allowed by the policy of the law." The extension of ten months
should be made to refer to a period of actual gestation. Three such
periods are possible: for example. A devises to B (of whom A's wife
is enciente at the time of A's death) for life, then to B's child C
(who may be en ventre sa mere at the time of B's death), and on
the death of C under twenty-one to his Issue (one of whom may be
en ventre sa mere when C dies). Professor Gray's example is not
so clear. Gray, Perpetuities (2d ed.) § 222.
40. The Missouri statute, making all failures of heirs and of
issue definite, was first enacted in 1845. Revised Statutes 1845, chap.
32, § 6.
41. Tyfe v. Willis (1733) Cas. temp. Talb. 1; Morgan v. Griffiths
(1775) 1 Cowper 234: Harris v. Davis (1844) 1 Coll. 416. An indefi-
nite failure of issue may occur In any future generation. Lewis,
Perpetuities (Suppl.) 68; Ohism's Admrs. v. Williams (1860) 29 Mo.
288. A definite failure is one which is to occur at any definite time,
which may not be the time of the ancestor's death, though the term
Is generally used to refer to a failure at the time of the -ancestor's
death.
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and since no estate tail is possible in slaves 42 it was clearly re-
mote.4 3
In Vaughn v. Guy,4 4 a deed 4 executed in 1837 purported
to give a female slave to one Susan and her heirs forever, with
a gift over in the event of Susan's death "leaving no lawful
issue." The gift over 40 was held to be on an indefinite failure
of issue 47 and, therefore void "as tending to the creation of a
perpetuity," although the court professed to be following Wilson
v. Cockrell.
42. State ex reZ. Haines v. Tolson (1880) 73 Mo. 320; Williams.
Personal Property (15th ed.) 356. A Kentucky statute of 1796, cited
in Betty v. Moore (1833) 1 Dana 235, 237, purported to convert es-
tates tail in slaves into fees simple. The desirability that slaves and
plantations should go together was probably responsible for the pe-
culiar development of the law as to personalty in the United States.
In a recent Missouri case, State ex rel. Farley v. Welsh (1913)
162 S. W. 637, realty and personalty were devised and bequeathed
to A and the heirs of her body. As to the realty, the statute abol-
ishing fees tail applied. Revised Statutes 1909, § 2872. See 1 'Law
Series, Missouri Bulletin, p. 5. As to the personalty, it was held
that A took a life Interest, with remainder to her bodily heirs. One
would have supposed that the words "and the heirs of her body"
were words of limitation, with the effect here of giving to A. an
absolute interest in the personalty.
43. The action concerned a female slave, a gift of which could
be remote because it carried the right to her offspring. Perhaps no
gift of a male slave could be remote. Gray, Perpetuities (2d ed.)
§ 228. The limitation over in the principal case was not for the
personal benefit of the donee, and, therefore, the failure of issue
was not definitely limited to the death of such donee. But see
State ex rel. Haines v. Tolson (1880) 73 Mo. 320. Where the gift
over is to a "survivor." It is generally presumed that a definite
failure was intended: Hughes v. Sayre (1719) 1 P. Wms. 534; Massey
v. Hudson (1817) 2 Mer. 130, 133; 1 Tiffany, Real Property, § 126 note.
Since it Is impossible to imply an estate tail In personalty [but cf. Hal-
bert v. Halbert (1855) 21 Mo. 277, and infra, note 48] the same words
may be construed as referring to a definite failure of issue in gifts
of personalty and to an indefinite failure of Issue in gifts of realty.
Forth v. Chapman (1720) 1 P. Wins. 663; 2 Jarman on Wills (6th ed.)
1959. But cf. Chism's Administrators v. Williams (1860) 29 Mo. 288.
44. (1853) 17 Mo. 429.
45. The court's statement that the distinction between limita-
tions created by deed and those created by will had been abolished
by the statute making all failures of issue definite (Revised Statutes
1845, chap. 32, § 6) is Incorrect.
46. It was improperly called a remainder since the previous
gift purported to be of the absolute interest.
47. There is abundant authority for holding that a gift of a
chattel on some one's dying without leaving issue, is good. Forth
v. Chapman (1720) 1 P. Wms. 663; Lewis, Perpetuities, 326; 2 Jar-
man on Wills (6th ed.) 1958; Marsden, Perpetulties 186.
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The terms of the parol gift of a slave in ITalbert v. Hal-
bert 48 were not clear but the court thought a definite failure of
issue was intended and no question of remoteness was therefore
involved. 49 In McCormick v. Kirby,50 the emancipation of the
slaves made it unnecessary to consider the possible remoteness
of the future interest.
These cases leave in doubt the possibility of creating an
executory interest in slaves by deed, even though the restriction
on remoteness be avoided. As to the creation of such interests
by will, there was never any question. In Chism's Administra-
tors v. Williams,5 1 there was a bequest in 1832, of personalty
which included a female slave, to C, with the proviso that if
C "should die without issue, then and in that case what I have
willed and bequeathed to her it is my will and pleasure that it
be given by [my] executors to my daughter, Mahala, to be
enjoyed by her and her heirs forever." The gift over was held
to be on an indefinite failure of issue and therefore void for re-
moteness.52 The court refrained from stating the rule against
remoteness.
48. (1855) 21 Mo. 277. It is interesting to note that the opinion
is by Judge Leonard who as counsel in Wilson v. Cockrell had con-
tended for the validity of the limitation over. The dictum that
"terms, which, if applied to real property, would give an estate tail,
pass the absolute interest in personal property," is erroneous when
applied to terms which in real property create an estate tail only
by Implication. Forth v. Chapman (1720) 1 P. Wms. 663. Nor is
the notion defensible that after an absolute gift of personalty, any
executory gift over is bad. Lamb v. Archer (1673) 1 Salk. 224. See
Gray, Perpetuitles (2d ed.) . 357. note 3. The dictum that a future
interest in realty "to arise upon the regular expiration" of an estate
tail created by implication was void, as "tending to a perpetuity" is
difficult to understand. Such interests have always been upheld. 2
Washburn, Real Property (6th ed.) § 1796; 1 Tiffany, Real Property,
§ 118.
49. It was probably a gift of a male slave (see note 43, supra)
on condition.
50. (1876) 63 Mo. 149.
51. (1860) 29 Mo. 288.
52. The court quotes with apparent approval Chancellor Kent's
statement that "a devise in fee, with a remainder over, if the devisee
dies without issue or heirs of the body, is a fee cut down to an estate
tail; and the limitation over is void by way of executory devise, as
being too remote and founded on an indefinite failure of issue." Kent's
Commentaries (13th ed.) 276. But, as pointed out in 1 Tiffany, Real
Property, § 156, note, the statement is pregnant with a misconception
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The first reported case in which the rule was applicable to
a limitation of realty 53 is Farrar v. Christy,54 where separate
tracts of land were conveyed by deed to Edmund and Howard
respectively, to hold to them and their heirs "upon condition
that should either of the grantees die without leaving legal heirs
of their body, the survivor shall inherit the whole of the prop-
erty hereby conveyed, and should [both] grantees die without:
leaving legal heirs as aforesaid, the property hereby conveyed
shall revert to the other legal heirs" of the grantors. The lower
court held that all the limitations over were void,5 5 presumably
because of remoteness; but the Supreme Court so applied the
statute governing estates tail" 6 that it became unnecessary to
consider any question of remoteness. Clearly, the last limitation
on an indefinite failure of issue was remote.
Harbison v. Swan 57 is a companion case to Farrar v.
Christy though the interests were created by will. The gift over
was on a failure of issue which was treated as definite, though
the statute making it So 58 was not referred to, and therefore
no question of remoteness was involved.
The statute making all failures of issue definite, first enacted
in 1845, 59 in terms applies only "where a remainder in lands or
tenements, goods or chattels" is so limited. But in Faust's
-the limitation after the estate tail must take effect by way of
remainder and not by way of executory devise. Bells v. Gillespie
(1827) 5 Randolph 273; Tenney v. Agar (1810) 12 East 252. As a
remainder it is vested (unless another contingency be incorporated)
and cannot be remote. Gray, Perpetuities (2d ed.) § 205. Any limi.-
tation which is to vest immediately after, or In derogation of an
estate tail, is not subject to the rule against remoteness. 1 Tiffany,
Real Property, § 156.
53. In Douaal v. Fryer (1831) 3 Mo. 40, the limitation over
was clearly on a definite failure of issue.
54. (1856) 24 Mo. 456.
55. See the argument of counsel, pp. 463 and 464.
56. This phase of the case was fully discussed in an article
on "Estates Tail In Missouri" In 1 Law Series, Missouri Bulletin,
pp. 29 et seq. The word "survivor" was read as "other," and it was
held that both Edmund and Howard took remainders in tail by im-
plication.
57. (1874) 58 Mo. 147.
58. Revised Statutes 1845, chap. 32, § 6. The testator in Har-
bison v. Swan died in 1852.
59. Revised Statutes 1845, chap. 32, § 6; now Revised Statutes
1909, § 2873.
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Administratrix v. Birner,0° it was applied to an executory
devise 6' which was therefore held "not too remote." This con-
struction of the statute has greatly reduced the number of cases
to which the rule against remoteness applies, for unless an ex-
press provision for an indefinite failure of issue is to be exempted
from the statute,62 the rule against remoteness no longer ap-
plies to gifts on failure of heirs or heirs of the body or issue of
living persons.63
In State ex rel. Haines v. Tolson,64 realty and personalty
were devised and bequeathed to A, with a proviso, if A
should "die without issue, that then, in such event, the estate
herein devised to [A] shall descend and go to" B and C. It was
not decided that the statute made the failure definite, but the
failure was held to be definite "because the limitation over is
to two persons in being and not to them and their heirs." 65
While it is established that the fact that the limitation over is
for the life of the ultimate donee shows that a definite failure
60. (1860) 30 Mo. 414.
61. This construction of the Missouri statute is well established.
Naylor v. Godman (1891) 109 Mo. 543; Yocum v. Riler (1900) 160 Mo.
281; Gannon v. Albright (1904) 183 Mo. 238.
62. It is conceived that the statutes changed only the common
law meaning of the expression "die without issue" by restoring it
to its natural meaning, and did not therefore make impossible gifts
on an indefinite failure of issue where such is plainly and expressly
intended. Cf. Yocum v. Sizer (1900) 160 Mo. 281. The English
Statute of Wills, 1 Victoria, c. 26, makes failures definite except
where an indefinite failure is shown to have been intended. Likewise
some statutes in the United States. 2 Leading Cases in the American
Law of Real Property 517. Concerning the New York statute which
is similar to that of Missouri, Chancellor Kent said, "The statute
speaks so peremptorily as to the construction which it prescribes,
that the courts may not, perhaps, feel themselves at liberty to dis-
regard its direction, even though other parts of the will should con-
tain evidence of an intention not to fix the period of the devisee's
death for [the] contingency to happen and that the testator had ref-
erence to the extinction of the property of the devisee, though that
event might not happen until long after the death of the first taker."
4 Kent, Commentaries (11th ed.) 280. But cf. In re Maben's Estate
(1889) 12 N. Y. Supp. 5. Certainly it is possible to provide for a
failure of issue definite as to some other time than the death of the
ancestor.
63. Armor v. Frey (1909) 226 Mo. 646.
64. (1880) 73 Mo. 320.
65. Logically this could make the failure definite only as to the
lives of the ultimate donees. and not as to the death of A as the
court thought.
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of issue was intended,6 6 the ultimate limitation in the principal
case might well have been construed as absolute, in view of the
statute 67 abolishing the necessity of words of inheritance.68
Lockridge v. Mace 69 is the first decision to make a clear
application of the rule. The testator devised to his wife for
life, remainder to his children for life, remainder to his grand-
children for life, and "upon the death of my grandchildren the
title in fee simple is to vest absolutely in my great grandchildren,
their heirs and assigns." Since the last remainder could not
possibly vest before the birth of great-grandchildren (it might
be contended that it would not vest until the death of the grand-
children) and since no grandchild was living at the death of the
testator, it was possible that the last remainder would not vest
within twenty-one years after any life in being at the death of
the testator. It was therefore held void for remoteness, a pos-
sibility of remoteness being as fatal as certain remoteness. 70
After Lockridge v. Mace, it is clear that the rule against remote-
66. Roe v. Jeffery (1798) 7 T. R. 589; Lewis, Perpetuities 212.
67. Revised Statutes 1855, p. 355.
68. The court's citations do not well sustain its decision. Tim-
berlake v. Graves (1818) 6 Munf. 174, went on the ground that a
personal benefit to the ultimate donees, was intended. In Chism's
Administrators v. Williams (1860) 29 Mo. 288. the presence of the
words of inheritance in the ultimate limitation was not relied upon.
In Diehl v. King (1820) 6 Serg. & Rawle 29, there was no intimation
that the ultimate gift was for life. Bedford's Appeal (1861) 40 Pa.
St. 18, was made to depend chiefly on the use of the word "then"
introducing the gift over. The court might well have rested the
principal case on the statute making all failures of Issue definite, for
which Faust's Administratrix v. Birner (1860) 30 Mo. 414, was au-
thority.
69. (1891) 109 Mo. 162.
70. The court quotes with apparent approval two statements of
Washburn's-the first refers to the rule against remoteness as being
aimed at restraints on alienation, 1 Washburn, Real Property
(6th ed.) § 217; the second is to the effect that "the limitation, in
order to be valid, must be so made that the estate not only may,
but must vest in possession within the prescribed period." 2 Ibid.,
§ 1790. It is unnecessary to point out the error in the first of these
statements. 1 Tiffany, Real Property, § 152; Gray, Perpetuities
(2d ed.) §j 268. As to the second, the court did not have in mind
the distinction between vested in possession and vested in interest,
which is well pointed out in Gates v. Seibert (1900) 157 Mo. 254. 268.
See also Kales, Future Interests In Illinois, § 255.
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ness applies. as well to contingent remainders as to executory
devises. 71
Naylor v. Godman72 involved, no question of remoteness
since the statute made the failure of issue on which the gift
over was limited, definite.78
In Gates v. Seibert,74 land was devised to Jacob "(and his
wife if he should marry) and after their decease to his children."
It was contended that since the children's remainder might not
vest in possession until a possibly remote time, the gift was void;
but the court repudiated the notion that the interest must vest in
possession,75 and since the children's estate would vest in inter-
est within ten months after Jacob's death, it was held that the
rule against remoteness did not apply. If the gift over had been
to the children of the wife, it would have been remote for Jacob
might have married a woman who was not born until after the-
testator's death.
Unless an attempt is made to create a future executory o,.-
contingent interest, the rule has no application whatever. In
Stevens v. Annex Realty Co.,76 land was conveyed by deed to
trustees to be held and improved as parks and private streets for
the benefit of certain lots, and the trustees were given power to
make assessments against the lot owners to cover taxes and
costs of improvements, and the deed contained elaborate pro-
visions for the covenants' running with the land. The effect of
the conveyance was to create certain present interests, sometimes
called "equitable easements,"' 77 to which the rule against re-
moteness does not apply.78 The trust in this case was not
71. On the general question of the rule's applying to contingent
remainders, see Lewis, Perpetuities (Suppl.) 130; Gray, Perpetuities
(2d ed.) .§ 285 and 286. Though contingent remainders are now
alienable under the Missouri statutes. ,ummet v. Realtv Co. (1907)
208 Mo. 501, the rule still applies to their creation. Lewis, Perpe-
tuities (Suppl.) 18 and 19.
72. (1891) 109 Mo. 543.
73. To the same effect, Wead v. Gray (1880) 8 Mo. App. 515.
74. (1900) 157 Mo. 254.
75. See Stewart v. Coshow (1911) 238 Mo. 662.
76. (1902,) 173 Mo. 511.
77. King v. Union Trust Co. (1909) 226 Mo. 351, 365; 1 Tiffany,
Real Property, § 348. The better term Is "equitable servitudes."
78. The principal case is to be distinguished from London & R.
W. R71. Co. v. Gomm (1882) 20 Oh. Div. 562. where a covenant to
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limited in duration, and the decision clearly shows that no limit
is necessary. 79
The construction of any limitation must be made wholly
independently of the rule against remoteness.80 But how far
may the effect of applying the rule be considered in determin-
ing what is the will of a testator? In Bradford v. Blossom,"1
the will as drawn was thought to have violated the rule against
remoteness by providing for the payment of income during the
lives of unborn grandchildren of the testatrix,82 and the court
was prepared to hold it void for that reason if the question had
been presented. But the point was noticed only to prove the
variance of the instrument from the testatrix's intention.
The devise in Shepperd v. Fisher83 requires careful analy-
sis. After giving to his widow a life estate in all his lands the
testator devised certain lands in trust for his daughter Mary for
life and "at her death to her bodily heirs, if the said bodily
heirs have issue, forever, but should the said bodily heirs of the
reconvey land when it should be needed for the railway was held
void because "the right to call for conveyance of the land is an
equitable interest or equitable estate," and in this case contingent
on the land's being needed for railway purposes. See a discussion
of this case in Kales, Future Interests in Illinois, §§ 259 and 260.
Cf. South Eastern Ry. Co. v. Cement Manufacturers (1910) 1 ch. 12,
which is discussed in 27 Law Quarterly Review 150. The
rule seems to be settled in Missouri that covenants for the
perpetual renewal of leases, while not favored, will be enforced.
Blackmore v. Boardman (1859) 28 Mo. 420. Cf. Diffenderfer v. St
Louis Public Schools (1893) 120 Mo. 447; Lackland v. Walker (1899)
151 Mo. 210. See also Gray, Perpetuities (2d ed.) §§ 230 and 230a;
13 Harvard Law Review 482. But see 6 Central Law Journal 203.
79. See Lich v. Lich (1911) 158 Mo. App. 401. This is an im-
portant feature of the case in view of the recent tendency toward
the so-called Massachusetts Real Estate Trust as a substitute for in-
corporation. Sears, Trust Estates as Business Companies, § 98. Cf.
Pulitzer v. Livingston (1896) 89 Me. 359; 2 Reeves, Real Property,
§ 963.
80. Dungannon v. Smith (1845) 12 Cl. & F. 546. See Gray, Per-
petuities (2d ed.) §§, 630 to 632.
81. (1905) 190 Mo. 110; (1907) 207 Mo. 177.
82. It is possible that each of the grandchildren took at birth
a vested interest in the income, in which event the gift could not be
remote. The statement in the second report of the case that on the
former appeal the will had been held "to be violative of the law
against perpetuities" must be erroneous, for the first report of the
case contains no reference to remoteness or perpetuities.
83. (1907) 206 Mo. 208.
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said Mary die without issue, then this estate is to revert to this
grantee [devisor], his heirs, assigns or legal representatives."
Since the rule in Shelley's Case was not in force,8 4 the statute
concerning estates tail had no application. Mary's bodily heirs
were clearly intended to have a remainder in fee which would
vest in them on Mary's death, but subject to be divested by the
gift over, operating as an executory devise by way of shifting
use, if they should die without issue.8 5 Though the clause "if
the said bodily heirs have issue" makes the gift of the fee contin-
gent in form, the cases are numerous which hold that it will vest
subject to being divested on the happening of the contingency. 6
The gift to the bodily heirs and the gift over should be read
together-plainly, it was the death of the bodily heirs without
issue which was to divest their interest. If issue had been born
and had failed to survive their parents, the gift over should take
effect. The whole devise, therefore, carried a life estate to the
widow, remainder to Mary for life, remainder to Mary's bodily
heirs in fee, with an executory devise to the testator's heirs in
the event that Mary's bodily heirs should die without issue sur-
viving them.8 7  But the court held that Mary's bodily heirs took
a life estate "liable to be enlarged into a fee by the birth unto
them of the issue referred to in the will." It is difficult to
conceive of such "enlargement" of the estates known to our law,
for the quantum of every interest must be determinable at the
time of its creation.88 On the court's view, the provision for
84. It was abolished as to devises in 1825, Revised Statutes 1825,
p. 794; as to deeds In 1845, Revised Statutes 1845, chap. 32, § 7.
Tesson v. Newman (1876) 62 Mo. 198. See 1 Law Series, Missouri
Bulletin, p. 10, note 35.
85. This was made a definite failure of issue by the Missouri
statute. Revised Statutes 1845, Chap. 32, § 6; now Revised Statutes
1909, § 2873.
86. Edwards v. Hammond (1683) 3 Lev. 132, is the leading case
on this point; Blanchard v. Blanchard (1861) 1 Allen 223; 1 Tiffany,
Real Property, §§ 120 and 141. See also Professor Kales' article on
Vested and Contingent Remainders, 8 I1. Law Review 225, 236.
87. Since the gift over was to take effect on the death of the
bodily heirs of Mary without Issue, I. e., not until all her bodily heirs
(determined at her death) died without issue, cross limitations should
be Implied of each bodily heir's Interest to the other bodily heirs,
to prevent an intestacy. Doe d. Gorges v. Webb (1808) 1 Taunt. 234;
Ashley v. Ashley (1833) 6 Sim. 358; 1 Tiffany, Real Property, § 126.
88. 1 Tiffany, Real Property, §§ 137 and 141, note.
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enlargement and the gift over were both void for remoteness.8s
But if the bodily heirs of Mary be held to have taken a fee
simple subject to being divested on their death without issue,
only the provision for divestment would be void for remoteness
since the fee would vest in them at the death of Mary, a person
living when the testator died, and the failure of the gift over for
remoteness would not affect the gift to the bodily heirs except:
to relieve it of the possibility of being divested.9 0
The court refused to consider any question of remoteness
in Buxton v. Kroeger 9 l because the case had been tried on
another theory. But in a dissenting opinion, Woodson, J.,
thought the deed was void because it was possible for the un-
born child of an unborn child to take. The deed created an
active trust which was to continue until ten years after the date
when the youngest of the grantor's children (some of whom
might have been born after the deed was executed) attained
lawful age, at which time the title to certain undisposed of rea.
estate was to vest in the grantor's children then living and the
heirs of children then dead. It was possible that the heirs of a
child born after the deed was executed, even if they should be
determined at the date of the child's death,9 2 might not be
ascertained within twenty-one years after any designated life
in being at the time the deed was executed. The gift to the
heirs of such children as should be dead when the trust
terminated, was therefore remote and void. And since the
grantor's children were to have no vested93 legal interest un--
89. On the court's view there may have been a contingent re-
mainder after the life estate in the bodlily heirs. If so, the fee must
have been vested In the testator's heirs pending the happening of
the contingency, and since the contingent remainder Is void for re-
moteness, the vested interest ought to continue in the testator's heirs.
90. Doe d. BlomfLeld v. Eyre (1848) 5 C. B. 713; Robinson v.
Woodi (1858) 27 L. J. Ch. 726; Brattle Square Church v. Grant (1855)
3 Gray 142; Saxton v. Webber (1892) 83 Wis. 617. See Gray, Per-
petuities (2d ed.) §§ 247 et seq.; Lewis, Perpetulties 532.
91. (1908) 219 Mo. 224.
92. It might be contended that they should be determined at
the time of distribution, viz., ten years after the youngest child
reached twenty-one. Cable v. Cable (1853) 16 Beav. 507. But see
Dove v. Torr (1879) 128 Mass. 38.
93. The majority of the court held it to be a contingent re-
mainder. The principle applied in discussing Shepperd v. Fisher,
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less they should be alive at the time set for the termination of
the trusts, which time, as shown above, might not have been
within twenty-one years after the end of a life in being when
the deed was executed, the gift to such of his children as were
not yet born or en ventre sa mere when the deed was executed,
was remote and void; and the gift to children alive when the deed
was executed was likewise void,94 because they were named as
members of a class which was not to close until a time possibly
remote.9 5
It was contended in Noel v. Hill96 that certain building
restrictions violated the rule against remoteness. The deed in
that case contained restrictions as to the building line, the num-
her of residences to be built, the purposes for which the lots
should be used .and the cost of buildings erected, and provided
that after twenty-five years from the date of the deed the owners
of a "majority or greater part of the frontage" on a certain street
might, by written consent, alter, modify or repeal these restric-
tions as to the lots fronting on that street. The court held that
while "restrictions in conveyances of the fee are regarded un-
favorably and therefore strictly construed," the restrictions in
this case were proper and enforceable, 97 and that there was no
"estate in perpetuity" created since all of the lot owners might
at any time remove the restrictions. But the expression "estate
in perpetuity" was probably used to mean inalienable interest,
for the statement that "it is only when there are no persons
in being who can convey an absolute fee in possession, dis-
charged of a future use or estate, that there is a perpetuity," has
no connection with the remoteness of vesting. A perpetual in-
supra, that a remainder may be vested though the limitation is in
form contingent, has no application where, as here, the contingency
is incorporated into the description of the persons who are to take.
Festing v. Allen (1843) 12 M. & W. 279; Emison v. Whittlesey, 55
Mo. 254; 1 Tiffany, Real Property, § 120.
94. 2 Woerner, Amer. Law of Administration (2d ed.) § 427.
95. The contention that the devise in Cox v. Jones (1910) 229
Mo. 53, created a remote limitation, was patently absurd. So in
Canada v. Daniel (1913) 157 S. W. 1032.
96. (1911) 158 Mo. App. 426.
97. Sanders v. Dixon (1905) 114 Mo. App. 229; Scharer v. Pan-
tler (1907) 127 Mo. App. 433; Kitchen v. Hawley (1910) 150 Mo. App.
497.
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junction had been issued by the court below but the higher court
modified it so as to provide for changes in the restrictions by
the owners of a majority of the frontage after the expiration
of the twenty-five years. The court did not think this modi-
fication essential. It may well be doubted whether the deed's
provision for an alteration, modification or repeal of the re-
strictions after twenty-five years was valid. The restrictions
themselves create present interests which cannot be remote s
As the court pointed out, the owners of all the lots might al
any time destroy the restrictions by releasing them since only
they are beneficially interested. But the change by the owners
of a majority of the frontage can be made only after twenty-
five years have elapsed-why is not the power to make this
change remote? Even admitting that a period of twenty-one
years in gross, i. e., without reference to any life in being, is
not objectionable, 99 a period of twenty-five years is certainly
not to be allowed. While the restriction itself may be created
for a limited time,'00 the right to change it, given as here to an
unascertained majority, is in the nature of a contingent future
interest and ought to be subject to the rule against re-
moteness.101
Curiously, no attempt has been made in this state to apply
the rule against remoteness to conditions contained in deeds or
98. Gray, Perpetuities (2d ed.) § 280.
99. "Whenever lives in being do not form part of the time of
suspension or postponement, the only period under the rule against
perpetuities is 21 years absolute." Andrews v. Lincoln (1901) 95 Me.
54, 50 AtI. 898. See also Kimball v. Crocker (1865) 53 Me. 263.
Professor Gray seems to assume that this is true. Perpetuities
(2d ed.) §§ 225 et seq. Mr. Marsden states that "if no lives are taken,
the period of twenty-one years must not be exceeded." Marsden, Per-
petuities 34.
100. In Kitchen v. Hawley (1910) 150 Mo. App. 497, the period Is
not given but it was probably thirty years or more. The rule against
remoteness has nothing to do with duration of Interests. Stewart v.
Coshow (1911) 238 Mo. 662.
101. "The Rule against Perpetuities is equally violated, whether
the commencement of the rent, term, or easement, be fixed at too
remote a period, or its continuance be liable to a clause of defeasance,
upon the happening of a future remote event. The only distinction
between the two cases, is, that, in the former, the Interest itself
fails of taking effect, while as respects the latter, that Interest be-
comes absolute and indefeasible, by the avoidance of the remote
clause of cesser." Lewis, Perpetuities 620.
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in wills. Conditions have been enforced without reference to any
time limit, in cases where the right of entry might have arisen at
a time beyond the limit of remoteness. 102 This is the general
rule in the United States,' 03 but it is difficult to defend on princi-
ple.104
It has previously been noted 105 that covenants for the per-
petual renewal of leases are enforced by the Missouri courts,
but the theory of their enforcement has not been worked out
and it would seem to be inconsistent with the foregoing discus-
sion of Noel v. Hill. This must be viewed either as an exception
to the rule against remoteness, 10 6 or the right to a renewal must
be called an "incident of the lease" 107 and therefore "part of
the lessee's present interest." 10
GIFTS TO CHARITIES.
It is frequently stated that "the rule against perpetuities is
inapplicable to charitable gifts," 109 but this does not mean that
the rule against remoteness is inapplicable to them. The word
"perpetuity" is used with reference to charitable gifts to mean "a
gift or conveyance forever inalienable." 110 A charitable gift "I
is not objectionable because the interest created is inalienable,1 12
102. Weinreich v. Weinreich (1885) 18 Mo. App. 364; Ellis v.
Kyger (1886) 90 Mo. 600; Hannibal & St. Jo. R. Co. v. Frowein (1901)
163 Mo. 1.
103. French v. Old South Society (1871) 106 Mass. 479; Gray,
Perpetuities (2d ed.) § 304.
104. In re Hollis' Hospital (1899) 2 Ch. 540; 1 Tiffany, Real
Property, § 155.
105. Supra, note 78.
106. This view was expressed by Sir George Jessel, M. R., in
London & S. W. Ry. Co. v. Gomm (1882) 20 Oh. Div. 562.
107. Blackmore v. Boardman (1859) 28 Mo. 420.
108. Gray, Perpetuities (2d ed.) § 230.
109. Farmers' and Merchants' Bank v. Robinson (1902) 96 Mo.
App. 385, 391; Tiedeman, Real Property (3d ed.) § 641.
110. Farmers' and Merchants' Bank v. Robinson (1902) 96 Mo.
App. 385, 391; Cheeseman v. Partridge (1739) 1 Atk. 436.
111. Such gifts are defined in Chambers v. City of St. Louis
(1860) 29 Mo. 543; Missouri Historical Society v. Academy of Science
(1887) 94 Mo. 459; Lackland v. Walker (1899) 151 Mo. 210; Adams v.
University Hospital (1907) 122 Mo. App. 675.
112. Estates created in individuals must in general be alienable.
A condition or a conditional limitation restraining an owner in fee
from selling the land is bad. Gray, Restraints on Alienation (2d ed.)
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nor because it may endure forever. 1 13 In Farmers' and Merchants'
Bank v. Robinson,114 a sum of money was given to the trustees
of a church to use the income for the support of a pastor on
certain conditions. The court said the gift was "a perpetuity in
the sense that it is inalienable and therefore must continue per-
petual," but "not a remote gift" and therefore good. This is a
distinct recognition of the difference between the rule against
remoteness and the rule against inalienability. In Buchanan v.
Kennard,1 5 the grant to trustees was admitted to be "made in
perpetuity," but was held valid. Stewart v. Coshaw' 6 is to
the same effect.
On principle, there is no reason why the rule against re-
moteness should not apply to all charitable gifts by way of exec-
utory limitation, and, if they are such that by possibility they
might not vest in interest within twenty-one years after a life
in being, they should be void.1" 7. Where a previous gift is to an
individual and a remote contingency postpones the vesting of
the ultimate gift to a charity, the ultimate gift is void.118 And
§ 23. So, a provision against alienation. Ibid., § 105. In some juris-
dictions, of which Missouri is one, the alienation of equitable life
interests can be forbidden by the creator. This is the familiar
spendthrift trust. Lampert v. Hayde7 (1888) 96 Mo. 439; Partridge v.
Cavender (1888) 96 Mo. 452.
113. Chambers v. City of St. Louis (1860) 29 Mo. 543; Academy
of the Visitation v. Clemens (1872) 50 Mo. 172; Goode v. McPherson(1872) 51 Mo. 126; Schmidt v. Hess (1875) 60 Mo. 591; Crow ex rel.
v. Clay Co. (1906) 196 Mo. 234. It is difficult to understand what was
meant in Chambers v. City of St. Louis, supra, by the statement, p.
589, that "if all the recipients of a charity could be designated with
certainty at the time of its creation, there would be no necessity for
a law of charitable uses different from that which governs all the
other trusts. The only difficulty in the way would be the law against
perpetuities, and that would not exist where the donation in trust
was made to a corporation." The court may have been contem-
plating such a statute as that in New York, which validates charitable
gifts to corporations where gifts to individual trustees would be bad.
Chaplin, Suspension of Alienation, §§ 444 and 450.
114. (1902) 96 Mo. App. 385.
115. (1910) 234 Mo. 117.
116. (1911) 238 Mo. 662.
117. Challis, Real Property (3d ed.) 95.
118. Leonard v. Burr (1858) 18 N. Y. 96; Brattle Square Church
v. Grant (1855) 3 Gray 154; Merritt v. Bucknam (1855) 77 Me. 253;
Gray, Perpetuities (2d ed.) § 594.
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the, rule is the same where the previous gift is to one individual
in trust for another.' 19 But it has frequently been held that
where the previous gift is to a charity or in trust for a charity,
the gift over is good though its vesting be postponed by a remote
contingency. 120 It is possible that this anomalous rule prevails
in Missouri. In Sappington v. School Fund Trustees,'2' a trust
had been created by deed for the education of poor children of
Saline County, but "in the event that at any time hereafter the
common school fund, and other educational funds which may
be provided by the state, or which may come into the possession
of the state from any source whatever, for the purpose of edu-
cation, shall become sufficient to educate all the poor children
of said county, then the said board of trustees are hereby au-
thorized and requested to apply the interest of said fund to
such other objects of charity in said county as in their judgment
may be most needy." 122 The court held that the event upon
which the beneficiary was to be changed had not occurred, after
which it became unnecessary to refer to the possible remoteness
of the change. If the event had happened, the case would have
called for a decision as to the applicability of the rule against
remoteness and the anomalous rule stated above might have
been adopted. It should be noticed, however, that the result for
which the donor stipulated could have been accomplished by
a court of equity on the doctrine of cy pres. While the applica-
tion of the trust fund in Sappington v. School Fund Trustees
for the poor children of Saline County depended on the possibly
remote contingency of such persons' being in existence, 128 the
119. Commissioners v. De Clifford (1841) 1 Dr. & W. 245, 254.
120. Christ's Hospital v. Grainger (1849) 1 Macn. & G. 460; In re
Tyler (1891) 3 Ch. 252; Webster v. Wiggin (1891) 19 R. I. 73; Hop,
kins v. Grimshaw (1897) 165 U. S. 342; Brigham v. Peter Bent Brig-
ham Hospital (1904) 134 Fed. 513. The rule stated in the text has
been criticised by Professor Gray, Perpetuities (2d ed.) §§ 597 to
603h. See also 6 Harvard Law Review 195; 7 Ibid. 406; 8 Ibid. 211.
121. (1894) 123 Mo. 32.
122. The court held that the gift was not void for indefiniteness.
See also First Baptist Church v. Robberson (1879) 71 Mo. 326; Howe
v. Wilson (1886) 91 Mo. 48; Powell v. Hatch (1890) 100 Mo. 592;
Barkley v. Donnelly (1892) 112 Mo. 561.
123. Gray, Perpetuities (2d ed.) § 603b.
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gift for that purpose created an immediate, present interest and
therefore could not be remote. 124
Where there is a gift to a corporation or association for a
charitable object, with no preceding gift, the courts incline to
find that an immediate gift is intended. If a precedent contin-
gency is clear, the gift will be void unless the contingency must
happen within the limits of a period not remote.' 25 But chari-
table gifts to corporations or associations to be formed are held
good, usually on the doctrine of cy pres, but sometimes also in
jurisdictions where that doctrine is repudiated.1 26 In Schmidt
v. Hess,127 a deed purported to convey land to the "Lutheran
Church" which was not then organized. The court held that
"although in consequence of the non-incorporation of the church
for whose benefit the grant was made, there was no one in esse,
at the time of making the donation, capable of being the re-
cipient of the trust; yet the use being a charitable one, a court
of equity, having ascertained the intent of the grantor, will not
allow the grant on that account to fail, but will see to its effectua-
tion." This must be taken as a statement of the doctrine of
cy pres,12 8 but the decree vested the title in the later organized
trustees. It does not appear how much time elapsed after the
deed of gift and there was no reference to possible remoteness.
THE EFFECT OF REMOTENESS.
Every possibly remote limitation is of course void. The
instrument in which it is created should, as a general rule, be
given effect as though the void limitation had been omitted, 29
124. First Baptist Church v. Robberson (1879) 71 Mo. 326; In-
graham v. Ingraham (1897) 169 Ill. 432; 1 Tiffany, Real Property,
§ 158.
125. Chamberlayne v. Brockett (1872) 8 Ch. App. 206.
126. Tilden v. Green (1891) 130 N. Y. 29. Gray, Perpetuitles
(2d ed.) §§ 615 et seq.
127. (1875) 60 Mo. 591.
128. Missouri Historical Society v. Academy of Science (1887)
94 Mo. 459. The principal case has also been explained as a con-
veyance to a voluntary association, which is valid In Missouri. Mis-
souri Historical Society v. Academy of Science, supra; Lilly v. Tobein
(1890) 103 Mo. 477; but cf. Green v. Dennis (1826) 6 Conn. 293: but
it would seem that no association was In existence at the time of the
gift.
129. "If a limitation over is void by reason of its remoteness,
it places all prior gifts in the same situation as if the devise over
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though for purposes of construction the void limitation must be
regarded. It would seem, then, that prior limitations can be
upheld though later limitations are void for remoteness. It is a
general rule in wills that though the testator's intention cannot
take effect to the full extent, it will be effectuated as far as
possible.
In two Missouri cases, however, the effect of the remote-
ness of subsequent limitations was to invalidate the prior linita-
tions also. In Lockridge v. Mace,130 there was a devise to the
testator's wife for life, remainder to his children for life, re-
mainder to his grandchildren for life, remainder to his great-
grandchildren in fee. After deciding that the last limitation was
void for remoteness, the court held that the devise "constituting,
as it does, but one disposition of the 'home farm,' must fail in
toto," and the property passed to the testator's heirs. In Shepperd
v. Fisher,13 1 the testator devised his homestead to his wife for
life, remainder as to a moiety of the homestead in trust for his
daughter Mary for life, "and at her death to her bodily heirs,
if the said bodily heirs have issue, forever, but should the said
bodily heirs of the said Mary die without issue," then to the
testator's heirs; remainder as to the other moiety in trust for
another daughter for life, with a similar gift over to her bodily
heirs. This devise was held to "constitute but one general dis-
position of all the lands and tenements of which the testator
died seized," and the whole was declared void.
In deciding Lockridge v. Mace, the court was "guided by
[certain] authorities" which should be examined. The state-
ment quoted from Sir William Grant in Leake v. Robinson,132
had been wholly omitted." Brattle Square Church v. Grant (1855)
3 Gray 142; Lovering v. Worthington (1870) 106 Mass. 86. But "a
limitation which is itself too remote, although it cannot take effect
as a limitation, will have its effect in determining the meaning of other
parts of the Instrument." Marsden, Perpetuities 276; Heasman v. Pearse
(1871) L. R. 7 Ch. 275.
130. (1891) 109 Mo. 162. See supra, p. 12. The will took
effect in 1868, after the abolition of the common law estates tail.
Therefore, the doctrine of cy pres could not have been applied to save
the limitations from remoteness. 1 Law Series, Missouri Bulletin, p.
10; Gray, Perpetuities (2d ed.) § 669.
131. (1907) 206 Mo. 208.
132. (1817) 2 Mer. 363. The quotation is: "Perhaps it might
have been as well if the courts had originally held an executory
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was made with reference to a gift to grandchildren at twenty-
five, which he refused to construe into a gift to them at twenty-
one by disregarding the excess of fotir years which made the
gift remote, and had nothing to do with the effect of the re-
moteness of subsequent on prior limitations; furthermore, prior
gifts in Leake v. Robinson were actually upheld. In Donohue v.
McNichol,1 3 prior gifts were upheld, though later ones failed for
remoteness and the case stands for the opposite of the propo-
sition for which it is here cited. Nor is there any authority for
the proposition in question in Hawley v. James,134 where a trust
term was held void under the peculiar New York statutes as to
alienation, 35 and the validity of previous gifts in spite of the
remoteness of subsequent limitations is recognized in later New
York cases.1 36 While St. Amour v. Rivard '37 has frequently
been cited for the proposition for which it was cited in Lock-
ridge v. Mace, no such proposition is stated in the opinion of
the court.' 38  The testator attempted to create an indefinite suc-
cession of life estates with an ultimate gift on "extinction" of
his "posterity" to his "next heirs." The court apparently
thought the whole devise void, but it is nowhere clearly stated,
no authorities are cited, and it was not necessary to decide that
the life estate given to the first taker, a living person, was void,
devise transgressing the allowed limits to be void only for the excess,
where that excess could, as in this case it can, be clearly ascertained.
But the law is otherwise settled." Also quoted in 2 Leading Cases
in the American Law of Real Property 487.
133. (1869) 61 Pa. St. 73.
134. (1836) 16 Wend. 60.
135. For the peculiar effect of this New York statute, see Knox
v. Jones (1872) 47 N. Y. 389. See also an article by George F. Can-
field, in 1 Columbia Law Review 224, on "The New York Revised
Statutes and the Rule Against Perpetuities."
136. Savage v. Burnham (1858) 17 N. Y. 561; Van Schuyler v.
Mulford (1875) 59 N. Y. 426. See note 155, inlra.
137. (1852) 2 Mich. 294.
138. Professor Gray, Perpetuitles (2d ed.) § 249a, note, explains
St. Amour v. Rivard as a devise of "an estate tail (in Michigan by
statute an estate in fee simple) with a proviso that each tenant
should hold for life only; this proviso was declared invalid." But in
view of the court's refusal to apply the doctrine of cy pres, It is
difficult to find an estate tall. If an estate tail was created, it was
in the testator's grandchildren and not in his children. See Gray,
Perpetuities (2d ed.) ii 655 and 665. But cf. Forsbrook v. Forsbrook
(1867) L. R. 3 Ch. App. 93.
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for he seems to have conveyed to the plaintiffs. It was held
that the grandchildren's life estate was void, though this was
not necessitated by the rule against remoteness. 13 9 In later
Michigan cases,140 it is recognized that previous gifts may be
valid though subsequent limitations are void.
It would seem, therefore, that the authorities cited 141 in
Lockridge, v. Mace did not impel the decision of the court. Shep-
perd v. Fisher was decided mainly on the authority of Lock-
ridge v. Mace, and cases there cited. The additional citations
in Shepperd v. Fisher 142 lend little support to its doctrine. Of
the eleven cases cited, two 14 are cases dealing with the peculiar
New York statute on alienation, previously referred to, 144 and
are therefore of no value; two 145 are cases dealing with the
passing of property invalidly limited, to heirs rather than to
residuary devisees; three 146 are cases in which there were no
previous gifts. Of the other cases, Tregonmwell v. Sydenham 147
supports the validity of previous limitations, and Post v.
Hover148 contains a dictum in support of their validity, though'
the point was not involved. In Lanrence v. Smith 149 the tes--
139. In 2 Leading Cases on the American Law of Real Property
488, the editors cited St. Amour v. Rivard as holding that "where
a devise is void for remoteness, it will not be void only for the
excess, but will be wholly void," and upon this is based their state-
ment which is quoted by the Missouri Court in Lockridge v. Mace.
140. Wilson v. Odell (1885) 58 Mich. 533; Palms v. Palms (1888)
68 Mich. 355; Dean v. Mumford (1894) 102 Mich. 511; Niles v. Mason
(1901) 126 Mich. 482.
141. With the exception of the statement quoted from 2 Leading
Cases in the American Law of Real Property 488, which is based
on St. Amour v. Rivard, and which is by the editors of those cases,
the only citation in point was of St. Amour v. Rivard, and it is of
doubtful value.
142. On page 247 of the opinion.
143. Casgrain v. Hammond (1903) 134 Mich. 419; La Farge v.
Brown (1898) 52 N. Y. Supp. 93. The Michigan statute is a verbatim
copy of the New York statute, and the Michigan court has followed
the New York interpretation of it.
145. Van Kleeck v. Dutch Reformed Church (1837) 6 Paige 600;
Jenkins v. University (1897) 17 Wash. 160.
146. Greene v. Dennis (1826) 6 Conn. 293: Tilden v. Green (1891)
130 N. Y. 21: Andrews v. Lincoln (1901) 95 Me. 541.
147. (1814) 3 Dow. 194.
148. (1865) 33 N. Y. 593.
149. (1896) 163 Ill. 149. But see Howe v. Hodge (1894) 152 II1.
252; Nevitt v. Woodburn (1901) 190 Ill. 283; Chapman v. Cheney
(1901) 191 Ill. 574.
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tator gave all his estate to trustees who were to pay certain an-
nuities, and other annuities to each of three daughters, and on
the death of each to pay "to each of her children $3oo annually
until such child reached twenty-five, and then to pay it $ioOOO."
The daughters had certain children alive when the testator died,
but the court held that since all of their children could not take,
the trust must fail for those who were alive when the testator
died. But no reason is perceived why the gifts to the living
grandchildren were not good. An eminent authority has called
the decision "incomprehensible." 150 Thomas v. Gregg 151 in-
volved the exercise of a power, and held the appointment to be
remote and therefore invalid, though all interests must have
vested within the necessary period. It has been sharply criti--
cised,15 2 and is now overruled. 153 Of all the cases cited in
both Lockridge v. Mace and Shepperd v. Fisher, therefore, only
St. Amour v. Rivard and Lawrence v. Smith lend real support
to the proposition of those cases, and Lawrence v. Smith is dis-
tinguishable as a gift to a class. 15 4
The decisions are numerous in which prior gifts have been
held valid, though subsequent limitations were void for remote--
ness.15 5 This general rule is recognized by the Missouri court
150. Gray, Perpetuities (2d ed.) § 249g. Professor Kales speaks
of Lawrence v. Smith as going to the "extreme limit." Kales, Future
Interests in Illinois, § 183. But it was followed In Eldred v. Meek(1899) 183 Ill. 26; Pitzel v. Schneider (1905) 216 Il1. 87. See also
Reid v. Voorhees (1905) 216 Ill. 236. In Eldred v. Meek, the court
relied on Johnston's Estate (1898) 185 Pa. 179, for a discussion of
which, see Gray, Perpetuities (2d ed.) § 249b.
151. (1892) 76 Md. 169.
152. Gray, Perpetuities (2d ed.) § 245c.
153. Graham v. Whitridge (1904) 57 Atl. 609; cf. Heald v. Heald
(1881) 56 Md. 300.
154. There is more reason for holding entirely void a gift to
the members of a class where some of them cannot take, for the
donor did not intend the preference which would otherwise result.
Of course the whole is remote and void unless the class must close,
and the shares be determined within the prescribed period. Leake v.
Robinson (1817) 2 Mer. 363.
155. De Peyster v. Clendining (1840) 8 Paige 295; Haxtun v.
Corse (1848) 2 Barbour Ch. 506, 509; Monypenny v. Dering (18521
2 De Gex, M. & S. 145; WilZiams v. Conrad (1859) 30 Barbour 524;
Dit Bois v. Ray (1860) 7 Bosworth 244; Smith v. Smith (1870) L. R.
5 Ch. App. 342; Lovering v. Worthington (1870) 106 Mass. 86; Golds-
borough v. Martin (1874) 41 Md. 488; Hale v. Hale (1876) L. R. 2
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in Shepperd v. Fisher, but it will not be applied by this court
where there is a "general plan of disposition made by the
will." 156 The court has not been confronted with a case 157
where a fee simple has been vested, and the ultimate remote
limitation is made in substitution for, or in derogation of it-
the decisions elsewhere universally hold that the prior estate
is good in such cases;158 nor with a trust for accumulation-
which is always upheld if vested, though the direction for ac-
cumulation be nugatory.159 It will not be surprising, if, when
a proper case arises, Lockridge v. Mace and Shepperd v. Fisher
should be narrowly restricted. 16 0 Both involved devises by the
testator of his "home place," and an intention was found in both
cases to "preserve intact" the "home place" devised; further-
more, the devises in both cases were to some of the testator's
heirs with limitations to his descendents in later generations,
providing, therefore, for what may be termed a general scheme
Ch. Div. 643; Heald v. Heald (1881) 56 Md. 300; Wheeler v. Fellowes(1884) 52 Conn. 238; Ward v. Ward (1887) 105 N. Y. 68; Stout v. Stout
(1888) 44 N. J. Eq. 479; Saxton v. Webber (1892) 83 Wis. 617 (all of the
above cases are cited in Shepperd v. Fisher); Arnold v. Congreve(1830) 1 Russ. & M. 215; Parks v. Parks (1841) 9 Paige 106, 117;
Taylor v. Frobisher (1852) 5 De Gex & Sm. 191; Courtier v. Oram
(1855) 21 Beav. 91; Reed v. Goodina (1856) 21 Beav. 478; Savage v.
Burnham (1858) 17 N. Y. 561; Watkins v. Quarles (1861) 23 Ark.
179; Wood v. Griffin (1865) 46 N. H. 230; Goodier v. Johnson (1881)
18 Ch. Div. 441; Lawrence's Estate (1890) 136 Pa. 354; Leake v.
Watson (1891) 60 Conn. 498; Beers v. Narramore (1891) 61 Conn. 13;
Post v. Rohrback (1892) 142 Ill. 600: Howe v. Hedge (1894) 152 Ill.
252; Nevitt v. Woodburn (1901) 190 II1. 283; Chapman v. Cheney
(1901) 191 Ill. 574.
156. In almost all of the cases cited in the next preceding note,
there was one general plan of disposition but the courts refused to
declare the whole void on this account. Cf. Board of Trustees v. May
(1906) 201 Mo. 360; Sevier v. Woodson (1907) 205 Mo. 202.
157. Though it would seem that the devise in Shepperd v. Fisher
ought to have been so construed. See p. 14, supra.
158. Challis, Real Property (3d ed.) 192.
159. See Lewis, Perpetuities 592; Gray, Perpetuities (2d ed.)
§§ 671 et seq.; Tiffany, Real Property, § 159; Marsden, Perpetuities, 319.
160. See 20 L. R. A. 509, where Lockridge v. Mace is spoken of
as being "somewhat out of line with the other courts." After stating
Lockridge v. Mace, Professor Gray says, "It is confidently to be hoped
that the learned Court of Missouri will come into line." Perpetuities
(2d ed.) § 249a. But see Phillips v. Heldt (1904) 71 N. E. 520: C4
Amer. State Reports 634.
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of descent.16 Either of these facts, though not material, might
be seized upon in distinguishing these cases. But there is danger
in the elasticity of the expression "one general disposition," for
it is impossible to -say when a devise will be wholly void because
of the remoteness of a single limitation.' 6 2
It would seem that a limitation expectant upon a previous
limitation which is void for remoteness should be good unless
it, too, violates the rule.16 3 The English decisions contra 164
seem to be based on an arbitrary rule which ought not be en-
grafted on the law of remoteness. No case involving this ques-
tion has arisen in Missouri. The subsequent limitation is not
accelerated as a consequence of the invalidity of a previous re-
mote limitation.
161. If the rule of Lockridge v. Mace be rested on the ground
that it would defeat the primary intent of the testator to give effect
to the limitations to his widow and his children and grandchildren,
without giving effect to the limitation to his great-grandchildren, it
may be doubted whether It is more probable that the testator would
have desired his property to pass as intestate property, than that
he would have desired to "tie it up" as long as possible, viz., to
his grandchildren, and thereby make certain provision for his widow,
his children and his grandchildren. The effect of Lockridge v. Mace
was to cut off the grandchildren from any certain enjoyment of the
estate. Why should the testator's "general scheme" be important,
unless the court is willing to conjecture as to the relative Importance
of the various intentions which the testator might have entertained
if he had known a part of his will was void?
162. If the court should see fit to overrule Lockridoe v. Mace
and Shevperd v. Fisher, it would not be doing great violence to the
principle of stare decisis, for it would be declaring valid gifts previously
held void, and not declaring void gifts previously held good. It may
be conceded that in the law of property a decision in reliance on
which conveyances have been made and estates have been created,
should stand as law until changed by the legislature, unless it is
grossly improper. But Lockridge v. Mace has prevented -the creation
of certain interests and the execution of certain wills and convey-
ances. If the rule should be changed, It would make that possible
which has been Impossible. This, It is submitted, would be good
public policy.
163. Gray, Perpetuities (2d ed.) §§ 251 et seq.; 1 Tiffany, Real
Property, § 157; Lewis, Perpetuities, 661; 1 Jarman on Wills (6th ed.)
352.
164. Somerville v. Lethbridge (1795) 6 T. R. 213; Beard v. West-
cott (1813) 5 Taunt. 393; Monvpennv v. Dering (1852) 2 De Gex. M.
& G. 145: Re Thatcher's Trusts (1859) 26 Beav. 365.
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LIMITATIONS TO SUCCESSIVE GENERATIONS.OF UNBORN CHILDREN.
In several cases the Missouri court has stated, as a part
of the rule against remoteness, the supposed rule "that, if land
is limited to an unborn person during his life, a remainder can-
not be limited, so as to confer an estate by purchase on that
person's issue." 05 The statement that "it has become an im-
perative, unyielding rule of law that no estate can be given to the
unborn child of an unborn child," 16o has been quoted with ap-
proval in two cases. 16 7  In Shepperd v. Fisher,165 the court was
prepared to apply the supposed rule, but the limitation in question
was also remote. In a dissenting opinion in Buxton v. Kroe-
ger,169 it was said that "if it is possible for an unborn child of
an unborn child to take under the deed, it is just as void as if
such child had in fact been born."
The controversy over the existence of this supposed rule
need not be reviewed here.170 It has actually been adopted by
the English courts in the leading case of Whitby v. Mitchell171
from which the rule now takes its name, 172 and the authority of
165. This statement of the supposed rule is taken from 1 Fearne,
Contingent Remainders (10th ed.) 565 (note by Butler). It is
adopted by Cotton, L. J., In Whitby v. Mitchell (1890) 44 Ch. Div. 85.
166. 1 Washburn, Real Property (6th ed.) § 217. Professor
Washburn thought this a part of the rule against remoteness but
cites no authority for it. His actual statement of the supposed rule
is error in that it does not require a limitation to the first unborn
child. Gray, Perpetuities (2d ed.) § 291.
167. Lockridoe v. Mace (1891) 109 Mo. 162; Shevverd v. Fisher
(1907) 206 Mo. 208. But both of these decisions were rested on the.
rule against remoteness.
168. (1907) 206 Mo. 208.
169. (1908) 219 Mo. 224.
170. In support of Whitby v. Mitchell, see 14 Law Quarterly
Review 133; 15 Ibid. 71; 27 Ibid. 168; 29 Ibid. 304; 49 Sol. J. 414; 12
Columbia Law Review 199; Williams, Real Property (17th Int. ed.)
471; 1 Jarman on Wills (6th ed.) 287, note (b); Challis, Real Property
(3d ed.) 206. For the contrary view see 6 Law Quarterly Review 410;
14 Ibid. 234; 29 Ibid. 26; 88 Law Times 95; 16 Harvard Law Review
294. Mr. Charles Sweet, and Professor Gray are the leaders in this
controversy: see 12 Columbia Law Review 199; 29 Law Quarterly
Review 26; 29 Ibid. 304.
171. (1890) 44 Ch. Div. 85.
172. It Is now generally called the rule of Whitbu v. Mitchell,
29 Law Quarterly Review 304.
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which has since been recognized.' 7 3 It is believed that the rule
has not been adopted in any American case. Whether such a
rule existed at common law, 174 or whether it is a "non-existent
rule based on an exploded theory," 175 it serves no useful pur-
pose, and it is submitted that it should not be adopted in Mis-
souri. The rule against remoteness is a sufficient safeguard
against the undue suspension of the vesting of interests in prop-
erty. If A devises to B (who is alive at A's death) for life,
remainder to B's eldest unborn son for life, remainder to that
unborn son's child for life or in fee, the last remainder is void
for remoteness; but if the devise is to B for life, remainder to B's
unborn son for life, remainder to that unborn son's children who
may be born during, or within twenty-one years after the life
of B, the last remainder is not remote and there is no considera-
tion of public policy which requires it to be held void.
SUMMARY.
From the foregoing statement of Missouri law, it is clear
that the rule against remoteness, spoken of as the rule against
perpetuities, forbids only the creation of limitations which may
not vest in interest within twenty-one years, plus periods of
actual gestation, after a life or lives in being. It is settled that
the term of twenty-one years need not be referable to the infancy
of any person, and quite as certainly it need have no reference
to lives in being, for it would be absurd to allow a term of
twenty-one years after lives in being and to forbid the same term
wholly in gross. The rule is founded on a consideration of pub-
173. In In Re Nash (1910) 1 Ch. 1, where it was extended to equi-
table Interests; but in In Re Bowles (1902) 2 Ch. 650. the court
refused to extend it to personalty, since "there is no such thing as
a legal remainder in personal estate." Quacre, does the rule apply to
executory devises? In 1 Jarman on Wills (6th ed.) 286, Mr. Sweet
stated that it does not; but he seems to have changed his mind. 27
Law Quarterly Review 171; 12 Columbia Law Review 201.
174. For which Lord St. Leonards, Mr. Fearne, Mr. Preston, Mr.
Charles Butler, Mr. Joshua Williams, Mr. Leake, Mr. Challis and Mr.
Sweet have contended. See 29 Law Quarterly Review 304.
175. Gray, Perpetuities (2d ed.) § 290. In 29 Law Quarterly
Review 31, Professor Gray speaks of the rule of Whitby v. Mitchell
as "an alleged relic of antiquity which many eminent men have be-
lieved to be genuine."
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lic policy which forbids a suspension of the ownership of
property beyond the period set, but it has nothing to
do with inalienability, and alienable contingent interests may be
remote. 17 6 Nor is the rule concerned with the duration of legal
or equitable interests. The rule applies to both real and per-
sonal property, and to both legal and equitable interests, and to
contingent remainders as well as to executory devises and be-
quests. It does not apply to any present interests, such as vested
remainders, nor to legal and equitable easements or servitudes,
nor to building restrictions. Though the question has not been
raised, it probably has no application to conditions and rights of
entry for condition broken. Similarly, covenants for the per-
petual renewal of leases are exempt from the rule. Covenants
and contracts which create no legal or equitable interests in
property177 are, of course, not subject to the rule, since it 'has
only to do with the vesting of property interests.
Limitations to charities are not objectionable because they
may last forever, but it would seem that the rule applies to them
as to all other limitations, with the probable exception that after
a gift to one charity a contingent limitation to another charity
cannot be remote. Gifts to non-existent charitable organiza-
tions, it seems, will be upheld though the organization might be
formed at a remote time, but this can be explained as an appli-
cation of the doctrine of cy pres.
A limitation is remote if by any possibility it may not vest
in interest within the period prescribed, and the effect of remote-
ness is to make it wholly void. Previous limitations are not
176. For example, A devises to B for life, remainder to B's
unborn son for life, remainder in the event that the University of
Missouri should be kept at Columbia until after the death of B's
unborn son, to C and his heirs. C would have an alienable contingent
remainder but for the rule against remoteness which makes It void.
177. For example, A contracts to pay $1000 for the education
of each of B's unborn children at the University of Missouri. The
contract is binding, If supported by a consideration, though it puts
on A a liability to educate unborn persons at a time possibly beyond
the period of remoteness.
The fact that the rule against remoteness makes void a limitation
of property In a contract, does not affect the validity of the contract
as such, and an action of contract may be maintained where specific
performance would be denied on account of remoteness. Worthing Cor-
poration v. Heather (1906) 2 Ch. 532.
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affected by the remoteness of a subsequent limitation in the same
deed or will. But if all of the limitations are linked together in
one general scheme of conveyance or disposition, all are void
under the Missouri decisions, though they might easily be
separated. This is probably true also where a remote limitation
is followed by later limitations, which are all parts of a general
scheme of disposition, for which there is more authority in other
jurisdictions-but on principle these later limitations ought to be
good as prior limitations would be.
It is submitted that the rule forbidding a limitation to an
unborn child following a limitation to its unborn parent, is no
part of Missouri law except as such a limitation may be in-
validated by the rule against remoteness, and that there is no
sound reason for the adoption of such an artificial rule in this
state. MANLEY 0. HUDSON.
